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Everyday Borders in Calais: The Globally Intimate Injustices of 
Segregation 
Thom Tyerman - Department of Psychology, Sociology, and Politics, Sheffield Hallam 
University 
Abstract: This article offers an account of the 'globally intimate' injustices of everyday borders in 
Calais, showing how a racialised geopolitics of global borders is embodied locally through everyday 
practices of segregation. The intimate everyday embodiment of this segregation is crucial to the 
creation of a hostile environment for people racially identified as 'irregular' and underlies the border's 
power of division and world-making. Yet also, in the everyday lives of those struggling with and 
against this segregation, we find powerful political opposition to the border's injustices embodied in 
intimate ways. This article argues that a 'globally intimate' lens provides important insights into the 
racialised violence required to maintain geopolitical borders while at the same time revealing borders 
as sites of political contestation.  
Key words: Intimate geopolitics; critical border studies; racism; Calais 
1. ‘Apartheid is alive and well in Calais’ 
On the edge of Calais' historic centre, where shuttered windows of residential houses and tabacs 
merge with industrial warehouses and canals surrounding the port, stood an empty building. Squat 
and grey, it bore signs of weather and disrepair. Covered steps at the entrance offered a few metres 
protection from the wintery sky. Here, behind patchwork tarpaulin, forty people slept. An oil drum 
stove, the only source of heat, often remained unlit. Until the 1990s the building housed the BCMO 
(Bureau Central de la Main d’Ouevre) responsible for distributing dock-work at the port. Since 
closing it served as a municipal gym then a cold-weather homeless shelter. Despite freezing mid-
December temperatures the doors to the empty building remained closed. Local government policy 
only required opening the shelter once temperatures dropped below -5C at night. Even when the 
mercury fell, there was little rush to respond. So, forty people remained on the doorstep of a cold-
weather shelter, crammed together in this tight space, sleeping rough in the middle of winter. Entry 
risked reprisal from police, confiscation or destruction of possessions, or arrest and deportation 
because of their ‘irregular’ status. Maybe the shelter would open soon if it got colder. At least they 
would be first in line for 100 floor spaces available. But this would be a few days at most and then the 
doors would be locked again with them on the outside.
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The BCMO occupants had mostly left Sudan to escape violence and persecution because of 
their ethnicity or political opposition to the ruling National Congress Party and President al-
Bashir.
2
 Outside a nearby church fifty people sheltered in tents or under blankets in its broad 
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entranceway. The majority were men but there were also families with young children, all 
fleeing war in Syria. For most, Calais was the latest stage in an arduous journey seeking 
refuge, security, and a peaceful life. Starting from Sudan and Syria, others from Afghanistan, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Iraq, and Iran, along the way people encountered a sprawling European 
border system which criminalised and disrupted their freedom of movement (Jansen, 
Celikates, & de Bloois 2015).
3
 
 On the 21
st
 September 2015, French police evicted the BCMO and church occupants, 
completing a six-month operation closing all migrant spaces in Calais and displacing 
everyone to a single location, soon to gain notoriety as the ‘new jungle’. Alongside the 
charity-run Jules Ferry Day Centre, this became the only 'tolerated zone' for migrants in 
Calais. By August 2016 over 9,000 people were living in the 'jungle' in makeshift shelters and 
tents (Help Refugees 2016). Two months later, it was demolished. On the day of the BCMO 
eviction, when police violently pushed the last migrants from the town centre, a local 
solidarity collective declared ‘Apartheid is alive and well in Calais’ (Calais Migrant 
Solidarity [CMS] 2015c). 
 The BCMO scene is not how we typically imagine a border encounter. Rather than 
border guards and fences we find homeless people outside an empty shelter whose destitution 
is actively maintained by local authorities. Yet, this scene tells us something important about 
how global borders are intertwined and intimately embodied in Calais through everyday 
practices of segregation (See also Daigle in this issue on embodied bordering practices of 
sexual-affective relationships in Cuba). As Scheel notes, the construction of borders is an 
intimate practice, ‘always embodied and relational’ and always possessing a particular 
‘materiality and situatedness’ (2013, 283-285). In other words, it must always be done 
somewhere by someone against some other. In this article I argue daily acts of profiling, 
discrimination, harassment, and physical violence underlie a border control policy in Calais 
that aims to prevent 'irregular' movement across the border and to deter migrants from 
remaining in Calais itself. Police use an array of powers to stop and search, check identity 
documents, disperse from public spaces, and detain people they suspect of being 'irregular', a 
suspicion premised on racial appearance. They repeatedly evict spaces where migrants are 
sheltering, from squatted buildings to bridge archways, and disrupt charity food distributions, 
forcing migrants out to camps on the town's peripheries and into conditions of precarious 
destitution. In this way, migrants racialised as non-European are identified as 'irregular' and 
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segregated socially, economically, politically, and spatially from the ordinary workings of 
everyday life, which are thereby secured exclusively for 'regular' European citizens.
4
  
 These everyday acts of segregation are central to how the border is produced as 
'globally intimate' in Calais. Repeated again and again, segregation saturates everyday life, 
creating a hostile environment for 'irregular' migrants alongside a privileged space for 
'regularised' citizens thereby reproducing locally global divisions of racialised geopolitical 
borders. Global injustices and geopolitical inequalities are intimately embodied in the 
destitution 'irregular' migrants are forced into, the exhaustion, frozen temperatures, hunger, 
and illness that literally wears people down physically, mentally, and emotionally. Seeing 
how borders are embodied in everyday life, then, importantly reveals the 'globally intimate' 
injustices involved in their creation. At the same time, it reminds us of the everyday struggles 
with which migrants themselves confront border injustice.  
1.1 A note on positionality and method 
I write this article from a position of privilege. In terms of gender, race, class, and citizenship 
I benefit from numerous intersecting privileges, including the unequal effects of global 
borders, which facilitate my access to resources, education, and communities while denying 
this access to others. Acknowledging my own complicity in these hierarchical divisions is 
necessary to interrogate the injustices of global borders (see Turner and Vera Espinoza's 
discussion in this special issue on being implicated in the reproduction of the heteronormative 
state). From this position I hope not to speak on behalf of others but commit my own voice in 
solidarity with those who struggle against border segregation.  
 This article draws on field observation in Calais, France, between October 2014 to 
February 2015 and again in the summer of 2015, during which I participated in ‘solidarity 
work’ (CMS 2014) alongside migrants, activists, residents, charity workers and others who 
inhabit the milieu of border struggles in Calais. The form this work took changed daily but 
included distributing donated clothes, tents, and sleeping bags to migrant camps, monitoring 
police violence against migrants, supporting the running of squats, collecting firewood, 
water, or food, building shelters, conducting English language lessons and information 
sessions on UK asylum, transporting people to the hospital, signposting migrants to local 
services, fixing bikes, and co-organising protests. Globally oriented solidarity work is 
necessarily intimate, involving spending time getting to know others, sharing different 
experiences, and developing relationships between individuals which cross language and 
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community boundaries. It is also necessarily messy, responding to constantly moving events 
that characterise the border's everyday enactment. My participation in these activities brought 
me face to face with the border as a violently racialised political practice enacted throughout 
a variety of spaces in Calais, from cafes, parks, libraries, and train-stations in the centre to 
migrant camps contained on the peripheries.  
 The everyday violence and messiness of the border in Calais formed the practical 
ethical political context for my research and my decision not to conduct interviews. 
Confronted with the border's immediacy and the complex sinews of people's everyday lives 
in Calais, my carefully constructed theoretical framework, my questions regarding the 
'politics' of borders, migrant struggles, and human rights seemed distantly abstract. 
Furthermore, caught up in the everydayness of solidarity work in Calais I felt my 
responsibilities lay less in gathering stories for my research than responding to the people and 
situations I encountered. This is an example of the everyday 'rough ground' of ethical politics 
we all must navigate (Pin-Fat, 2016). An unfortunate result is the lack of direct migrant 
voices in this research. More than an issue of empirical 'data' this raises questions around 
authorship and representation. Who am I to write about the political struggles of others or 
represent their experiences? Yet, in Calais, a space characterised by structural violence and 
precarity for migrants, to ask for someone's story itself risks replicating the demand, so often 
made by asylum officers and border guards, that they give an exceptional account of 
themselves to justify their presence. However, remaining silent in the face of border 
injustices is equally a privileged act.  
 I am not forced to live these struggles, and I make no claim to represent migrants in 
Calais or possess some special insight into their lives. Such claims are, I suggest, unnecessary 
since it is possible to grasp the injustices embodied by borders through examining the 
encounters which make up their everyday operation. Indeed, migrants are constantly speaking 
through their actions, their movement perhaps making the strongest case for solidarity and a 
rejection of border politics. What I write is not mine alone but has been shaped by all those I 
encountered in Calais and beyond. In portraying the border's violence I hope not to speak for 
migrants in Calais, nor portray them as abject victims, but rather highlight the injustices they 
struggle against and so present a case for solidarity. 
 In this paper I evoke the border's intimate everyday embodiment by writing vignettes 
(italicized) portraying scenes of border encounter drawn from my own observations and 
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supplemented by media articles, NGO reports, and official documents. These encounters 
show how the border is embodied through practices of everyday segregation, confronting the 
reader with its globally intimate injustices, and encouraging critical ethical political 
reflection. Adopting an everyday 'intimate' perspective provides a useful 'aspect change' (Pin-
Fat 2016) from dominant frames of international politics, 'queering' the state-centric gaze of 
sovereignty, security, or law (Peterson 2014), inviting instead conversation about alternative 
visions of ethical politics and different possibilities for local and global relations. 
 First, this article outlines why using a 'globally intimate' lens matters and suggests 
analysing borders as everyday embodied encounters. It then details how everyday bordering 
in Calais works through practices of segregation, constructing a hostile environment to 
control and deter 'irregular' migration in ways which also embody an unequally racialised 
global geopolitics. Finally, I point to migrant practices of protest and everyday solidarity in 
Calais as globally intimate challenges to border segregation. 
2. Everyday bordering: intimate embodiments of racialised geopolitics 
Critical feminist and postcolonial scholars have long used intimacy to interrogate workings of 
global politics and power. Acknowledging the 'personal is political' and 'international', 
feminists point to the fundamental role of gendered intimate relations and ‘economies’ in 
constructing international politics as a male-centric, heteronormative, militarised, and 
capitalist 'pyramid of power' (Enloe 1996, 187; Conlon & Hiemstra 2017). This intimate lens 
reveals how multiple relations of power intersect and are embodied in our everyday relations, 
intertwining the local and domestic with the global and international. Similarly, postcolonial 
scholars trace how bourgeois governance of intimacy in colonial households was central to 
forming the gendered and 'racialised colonial worlds' of imperial statecraft (Stoler 2002, 9). 
Furthermore, they remind us of the ongoing global intimacy between the colonial past and 
postcolonial present, and how 'intertwined histories' of North/South continue to underpin 
unequal wealth, power, and exposure to violence in global politics today (Danewid 2017). On 
these accounts, intimate encounters of everyday life are understood not as incidental to global 
politics, nor as its mere reflection, but rather 'its marrow' (Stoler 2006, 3), the 'globally 
intimate' context where geopolitical imaginaries are made real but also tested and potentially 
undone (Peterson 2017). Examining everyday encounters as globally intimate we see how 
'intimate violence is foundational to geopolitical dynamics of force' (Pain & Staehili 2014, 
345) and vice versa, how 'the intimate and the global intertwine' (Pratt & Roesner 2006, 15) 
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and produce each other to make up the world in which we live. A ‘globally intimate’ lens 
allows us to interrogate how global structures of geopolitical power, and their postcolonial 
and racialised legacies, are not only experienced but also inform the categorisation of 
'irregular' and 'regular' migrants by the border.  
 I suggest a globally intimate analysis of borders requires starting with their everyday 
embodiment. Not taking borders at face value, as fixed or natural geopolitical structures, but 
seeing them as contested political practices of statecraft. As Critical Border Studies details, 
borders are not simply territorial boundary lines but performative practices of bordering 
bringing nation-states into existence as sovereign institutions in relation to an international 
geopolitical order (Parker & Vaughan-Williams 2009; see also Burridge et al. 2017). Borders 
are a particular way of doing politics, mapping the world, and relating to others. By 
controlling the movement of people and things across space, facilitating some and hindering 
others, borders produce subjects and spaces according to hierarchical distinctions of 
inside/outside, identity/difference, citizen/noncitizen, inclusion/exclusion and so on. While 
fundamental to international geopolitics, nation-state borders are an ‘ontological fantasy’ 
(van Houtum 2010) requiring constant ‘work’ to maintain (Rumford 2012). As Scheel (2013) 
points out, borders and bordered subjects are mutually constitutive and only exist to the 
extent they are performed in specific encounters between people on the move and efforts to 
control this mobility.  
 Analysing borders as intimate everyday embodiments, then, involves recognising how 
they are always done somewhere by someone against some other. Borders must be repeatedly 
made anew in numerous embodied encounters, from submissive rituals of passport control to 
potentially lethal restraints of deportees.
5
 Acknowledging the centrality of how borders are 
embodied importantly denaturalises our accounts of borders as fixed and self-evident, 
revealing them as sites of political contestation and struggle that are local and global (Conlon 
& Hiemstra 2017). It also reminds us of the time, effort, resources, and violence required to 
maintain borders' geopolitical power as well as the limits of this power when confronted by 
complex mobile subjects who exceed, challenge, and resist their control (Tyler & Marciniak 
2013; see also Shindo in this special issue for a discussion about language mastery as a 
disciplinary tool). Furthermore, it highlights the disparities of how borders are encountered 
differently by different people in intimate ways, and the uneven material effects that establish 
global inequalities as locally lived realities. Border controls predominantly restrict the free 
movement of people from the global south while facilitating the free movement of globally 
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privileged subjects predominantly from the global north, maintaining structural inequalities in 
the world including the unequal distribution of material precarity, political insecurity, and 
exposure to death (Jones 2017). These borders have their roots in colonial histories of 
domination, exploitation, and violence, and they continue to shape postcolonial world 
geopolitics according to a prejudicial 'metaphysics of "race", nation, and bounded culture 
coded in the body' (Gilroy 2004, 66-68; Davies & Isakjee 2018). Distinctions between spaces 
and subjects which continue to be foundational for international relations, such as 
national/international, citizen/noncitizen, native/immigrant, are therefore infused with 
racialised legacies of colonial rule (Bhambra 2017). As such, the everyday criminalisation 
and control of 'irregular' migrant bodies is crucial to the global reproduction of racialised 
hierarchies of humanity and power. In short, seeing borders as everyday embodied encounters 
reveals their globally intimate injustices, laying out the ethical terrain of border struggles 
while suggesting the possibility of political transformation and solidarity.  
 In Calais several intersecting borders are embodied in the policing of everyday life. 
Located on the Northern French coast twenty one miles across the Channel from Dover, 
Calais is one of the busiest crossings for goods and people between the UK and the European 
continent. The 1993 Sangatte Protocol established juxtaposed 'control zones' in Calais, with 
British border authorities operating within the port and Channel Tunnel train terminal. In this 
way, migrants are intercepted while still in France and so denied the right to claim asylum in 
the UK. Calais is also an external border of the European Schengen zone of free movement. 
While outside the Schengen zone, the UK participates in the Dublin arrangements, requiring 
asylum seekers to be processed in the first safe EU country they encounter, and makes use of 
EU data systems sharing biometric information on non-Europeans. Combined with stringent 
visa restrictions for citizens of refugee-producing countries, making ‘regular’ migration near-
impossible, this inside/outside position makes the UK border particularly impermeable for 
asylum seekers. Furthermore, with the externalisation of EU borders, ‘offshored’ and 
‘outsourced’ across the Mediterranean to neighbouring governments such as Libya who 
intercept, detain, and deter migrants on Europe's behalf  (Bialasiewicz 2012), as well as the 
internalisation of border security through biometric technologies, discriminatory 
surveillance, ID checks, everyday policing, and coerced fingerprinting (Broeders 2007), 
migrants encounter numerous borders before ever reaching Calais. Paradoxically, this 
discriminatory bordering encourages 'irregular' migration towards the UK/Calais in search of 
a less precarious life (Davies, Isakjee, & Dhesi 2017, 11-12).  
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 Calais exists within a wider European 'border security continuum' (Vaughan-Williams 
2010) that operates globally. Enacted through discriminatory visa regulations, militarised 
external controls, and securitised internal policing, Europe's borders divide the world's 
population up into a hierarchy of national citizenship and enforce a global restriction on 
people's freedom of movement (van Houtum 2010; Turner and Vera Espinoza, this issue). 
The inequalities of wealth, freedom, and in/security produced by this global bordering 
contribute to a racialised postcolonial world order marked by deep divisions between the 
global north and global south. Europe's borders work 'as a vast machine of illegalization' 
(Scheel 2017) by forcing those escaping these structural violences to use irregular means of 
migration and criminalising them for doing so. In this way, the irregularisation and 
criminalisation of the free movement of large parts of the world's population goes hand in 
hand with the continued racialisation of world politics and power based on hierarchies of 
humanity.  
 Calais, then, is a space saturated with control where multiple local/global borders 
intertwine and overlap. A complex assemblage of law, geography, technology, and policing 
not only prevents 'irregular' migrants from crossing to the UK but actively produces them as 
irregular in the first place, creating a 'bottleneck' which ensnares people escaping violence, 
poverty, or persecution at the same time as it demonises their 'transgression' (Davies, Isakjee, 
& Dhesi 2017, 2; Squire 2011). Understanding the Calais border as 'globally intimate' we see 
how its everyday enactment through segregation re/produces locally a racialised global 
geopolitics. This allows us to 'expose and contest normalizations' regarding the legitimacy of 
European borders and citizenship (Peterson 2017, 2) and instead trace the violent ways they 
racialise and criminalise those migrant subjects they supposedly (must) secure against.  
 In the next section, I contextualise the 2015/2016 'new jungle' in Calais within a 
recent history of French and British border policy, providing an everyday perspective on the 
political contestations surrounding key developments, to highlight the centrality of everyday 
segregation for how this border works. I then unpack the globally intimate injustices 
embodied by a border deterrence policy based around creating a 'hostile environment' for 
'irregular' migrants. I argue that everyday segregation simultaneously secures this particular 
border, by making transgression practically more difficult, and secures the global borders of a 
racialist geopolitics as intimately embodied. Finally, I conclude by examining some globally 




3. ‘The persisting error of 2002’: from Sangatte to the ‘New Jungle’ 
While Calais border policy has been 'reactive' to shifting events and competing priorities of 
different actors (Freedman 2018) underlying this has been a persistently racialised political 
discourse on migration in France and the UK. Since the 1990s, collapsing support for 
Socialist parties and high abstention rates corresponded with increasing electoral success for 
the far-right Front National and their anti-immigrant agenda in Calais (Goodliffe 2016, 127). 
In the second round 2017 Presidential elections, Pas-de-Calais was one of only two 
departments where Marine Le Pen won a majority over Emmanuel Macron (Le Monde 2017), 
and she was eventually elected to the National Assembly seat for its 11
th
 constituency in 
subsequent legislative elections. In 2014 an atmosphere of aggressive nationalism was 
palpable on Calais' streets. Pictures of Le Pen's stern gaze, framed by the Tricolore, lined the 
walls while Le Parti de la France posters cried out ‘Ni minarets, ni charia! France aux 
Français!’ (Neither minarets, nor sharia! France for the French!). In September, local anti-
immigrant group Sauvons Calais (Save Calais) organised a demonstration where prominent 
extreme-right orators evoked racist imagery and white supremacism, calling for ‘a war for the 
survival of our country and our people, to make France for the French’ (Chazan 2014). 
Following weeks saw violence against migrants increase, including arson attacks on a 
charity-run shower facility and a migrant squat (Nord Littoral 2014a, 2014b). At a press 
conference in Calais in October 2014, Le Pen claimed the presence of migrants in Calais was 
a national security threat and called for their automatic deportation irrespective of their 
asylum rights, declaring:  
‘Immigration is a true poison, the most visible and most shocking consequence of which is 
Calais. The clandestines are illegal, they are criminals in terms of the law, who have no 
business on our national territory’ (Pecqueux 2014).
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In the UK, for two decades Calais has repeatedly been framed in terms of border ‘crisis’ by 
politicians and media as a weak point in British defences against tides of immigration, 
indicative of asylum policy failure, and synonymous with loss of sovereignty, security, and 
government control (Reinisch 2015). In 1999 a Red Cross centre was opened in neighbouring 
Sangatte to shelter refugees from the Balkans. As numbers at Sangatte approached one 
thousand, British media depicted scenes of chaos and invoked fears of foreign invasion that 
continue to resonate today. With additional pressure from the Conservative party and Groupe 
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Eurotunnel, who manage the Tunnel, the French and British governments agreed to dismantle 
the refugee centre (Schuster 2003). However, this ‘solution’ did little except criminalise 
migrant presence, limit their access to humanitarian support, and impose on them conditions 
of ‘forced nomadism’ and destitution (Défenseur des Droits [DdD] 2017, 4) 
 In 2009, a large migrant camp became the centre of another political media spectacle 
in Calais. Labelled ‘the jungle’, it was presented as a lawless liminal space threatening the 
integrity of a British nation left defenceless by its ‘soft touch’ immigration policies (Howarth 
& Ibrahim 2012). Again, the camp’s ritual destruction was projected as a performance of 
state power but ultimately only intensified the migrant precarity in Calais in what local 
associations denounced as the ‘persisting error of 2002’ (CMS 2009). Over the next few 
years migrant numbers waxed and waned with cycles of occupations and evictions of squats, 
jungles, and small camps across Calais, sustained by daily police harassment and violence 
(CMS 2011). Yet by winter 2014, in line with record levels of refugees arriving in the EU 
fleeing civil war, persecution, and poverty, the migrant population in Calais had again grown. 
Camps and squats dotted the city and its surroundings. While conditions were harsh, each 
location offered some vital resource: proximity to key crossing points or food distribution 
sites, or access to electricity, toilets, showers, or the relative security and shelter provided by 
walls and a roof.  
Towards the end of 2014, the largest camp was the 'Tioxide' jungle. Comprising several 
hundred shelters and an abandoned sports hall, the camp was built on disused land beside a 
chemical factory after evictions during the summer. Smoke from the chimneys smothered 
shelters made from salvaged wood and plastic sheeting, the rain turning to mud a 
thoroughfare lined with shops and cafes serving tea, cigarettes, and chicken stew. One area 
housing hundreds of men, women, and children was polluted with a viscous milky-white 
sulphurous substance. One hydrant provided water for a thousand people. Nevertheless, 
council workers frequently shut it off. Above the jungle, a motorway led vehicles directly into 
the port. Regular traffic jams would stretch for miles, offering opportunities to stowaway 
inside or underneath trucks, but aggressively guarded by police. Stories abounded of early 
morning raids on the jungle fringes, police reportedly destroying property, physically 
assaulting people as they slept, and conducting arbitrary arrests.  
The other side of town, near the Channel Tunnel, 30-foot steel walls enclosed two massive 
courtyards and a disused factory. On one side, a large metal gate reinforced with makeshift 
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barricades stood at the end of a cul-de-sac, on the other, the words 'WE WANT FREEDOM' 
looked out over train tracks. 'Fort Galloo' was a squat occupied during the summer by 
migrants, locals, and international activists affiliated with the No Borders Network. In the 
courtyards people slept in abandoned shipping containers, tents, or basic shelters. Médecine 
du Monde erected emergency marquees while a French charity delivered chemical toilets and 
serviced them weekly. Others accessed the central factory hangar and a small house 
adjoining it. Despite the polluted air inside, the winter cold drove people to camp in the 
hangar, burning noxious railroad sleepers for warmth. Uniquely, Galloo residents 
represented most migrant communities in Calais and it soon became a hub of daily activity, a 
place where people could meet, charge their phones from an electricity generator fuelled by 
local supporters, or collect hosepipe water on their way to or from the Tunnel.  
In 2014, these were part of a network of locations throughout Calais, built around the 
rhythms and practices of migrants' everyday life, and linked to NGO sites providing meals, 
distributing basic necessities, offering French lessons or legal advice. Whilst migrants were 
excluded physically, legally, and bureaucratically from public spaces and civic life, the maps 
of everyday life for those with and without papers increasingly overlapped during this time, 
providing a stark display of the border's segregation. Migrant presence soon became 
politicised on both sides of the Channel. In August 2014, UK media reported 'ethnic riots' and 
'vicious turf war[s]' amid rising migrant numbers (Morrison 2014). Politicians quickly 
gestured towards strengthening border security, the French increasing numbers of riot police 
stationed in Calais and the British providing funding and a new port security fence. 
 In this context Calais Mayor Natacha Bouchart first proposed opening a 'day centre' 
for distributing humanitarian aid based at the disused Jules Ferry summer camp beyond the 
port. Declaring the existing situation ‘untenable’, Bouchart argued centralising aid services in 
one state-supervised location and ‘away from homes’ would ‘empty 80% of the […] migrant 
presence in the town’ and thereby ‘relieve the Calaisiens who have a right to a bit of serenity’ 
(Goudeseune 2014). In September 2014, the UK and France signed a Joint Declaration on 
'cross border security’ cooperation (Cazeneuve & May 2014), and two months later plans for 
the day centre were approved alongside further increases in riot police. In January 2015, 
coinciding with the day centre’s opening, Bouchart introduced a bye-law prohibiting the 
supply of aid to migrants beyond the centre. Eviction notices went up outside all squats, 
jungles, and camps as the moorland around Jules Ferry was designated the only 'tolerated' 
site for migrant dwellings. Local NGOs and activists denounced the ‘new jungle’ as a 
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‘bidonville par l’État français’, a state-sanctioned ghetto designed to evacuate the town of 
migrants and segregate them from its inhabitants (Salomez 2015).  
4. The border as segregation  
From the beginning, I suggest, the day centre and ‘new jungle’ were conceived within a 
wider border control strategy based on segregation between ‘regular’ and ‘irregular’ 
populations in Calais. Combining restrictive humanitarian provision with deterrence, this 
strategy confined migrants to a peripheral ‘tolerated zone’ while making the rest of town a 
space of zero tolerance. Offering (minimal) support in terms of food, medical assistance, 
legal aid, and shelter, the day centre contained the migrant population outside the ordinary 
places and public spaces of Calaisien citizenship. And it constrained migrants' mobility by 
tethering everyday subsistence to an isolated location away from key border crossing points, 
especially the Tunnel. In this way, the town’s geography was divided into centre/periphery, 
the population segregated along European ('Calaisien') and non-European ('migrant') 
identities. This was crucial to the 'global intimate' effects of the border. Not only did 
everyday segregation secure this particular border by corralling and disrupting 'irregular' 
migration, it also staged everyday life as an encounter with multiple global borders, 
reproducing racialised geopolitical relations of North/South as locally embodied realities of 
'regularity and 'irregularity'.  
 Through everyday segregation Calais replicated Europe as a racialised space, and 
subjectivity, of privilege and exclusion. Without it, the presence of non-European ‘others’ 
exposed the deceptive fantasy of the bounded nation-state and Europe as an ‘area of freedom, 
justice and security’ (European Union 2012) separate from and superior to the world beyond. 
As the French human rights ombudsman stated, border policy in Calais is characterised by a 
desire to conceal the presence of migrants and ultimately ‘to make them disappear’ (DdD 
2017, 1). In Calais, those who are irregularised as liminal racialised subjects by European 
borders are literally forced to live on the fringes, to sleep in forests or among sand dunes on 
the peripheries, and compelled to travel in clandestine hiding, holding on beneath speeding 
lorries or concealed within refrigerated trucks. Through everyday practices of segregation 
migrant subjects are constructed as ‘irregular’, criminalised and ostracised, while the border 
is secured as political necessity and intimately embodied reality. Whenever migrant numbers 
are too large, or when they move in next door, too close for comfort, when the homogeneous 
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fantasies of national belonging are disrupted too much, the state steps in to round them up 
and clear them out.  
 In October 2016 the ‘new jungle’ was evicted in the grandest spectacle yet. The camp 
was destroyed with thousands dispersed across France into temporary accommodation, 
detention, or onto the streets. Nevertheless, since then human rights observers report 
hundreds of irregular migrants remained or returned to Calais, again facing incredibly 
precarious conditions, their destitution and dispersal maintained by aggressive policing 
measures (DdD 2017; HRW 2017). The perpetual cycle of segregation and violence 
continues. And this should not be surprising because, as I have outlined, this is not 
exceptional but simply how the border works in Calais, and Europe generally, through 
deterrence. As I argue in the next section, this deterrence necessitates everyday segregation 
and the intimate embodiment of global borders.  
5. Embodying the border: the globally intimate injustices of deterrence 
Across Europe, significant amounts of work go into maintaining the myth that borders map 
out existing sovereign communities and divide people and places. Every day, people are 
monitored, chased, arrested, detained, deported, dispersed, forced into hiding, denied medical 
care, and more, to bring these unstable fantasies to life (De Genova 2017). In Calais this work 
doesn't simply police people's movement between states but also segregates everyday life in 
the town itself in order to create a racialised hierarchy of liveability between 'irregular' and 
'regular' subjects. For 'irregular' subjects everyday life becomes a 'hostile environment', to 
borrow the Home Office's revealing phrase, deterring 'irregular' migration by making 
subversion of border controls unattractive and intensely difficult. For 'regular' subjects the 
border remains invisible and unobtrusive. 
 Since Sangatte, deterrence has been the focus of bordework in Calais. British and 
French declarations clarify that, in addition to technology and fences, border security entails 
‘ensur[ing] all measures taken will deter illegal migrants from congregating in and around 
Calais’ and ‘giv[ing] no quarter to those who have no right to be here or who break the law’ 
(Cazeneuve & May 2014, 1; 2015, 10). This deterrence borderwork is outsourced to French 
police. As the police union head put it: ‘we are doing Britain’s dirty work here in France’ 
(Samuel 2015). Practically, this ‘dirty work’ involves imposing destitution on migrants by 
denying them shelter, preventing access to basics needs including food, water, clothing, and 
washing facilities, prohibiting aid provision to migrants, and exposing them to daily police 
 14 
harassment and violence. Migrants are excluded from public swimming pools and libraries 
for lacking the correct documentation, refused service in shops and cafés, dispersed from 
parks and subjected to arbitrary yet racially-profiling ID checks, stops, and searches by 
police, and face physical attacks from local racists (CMS 2011). They are forced to sleep on 
the cold ground, under bridges, out in the open, in forests, only to be kicked awake and 
gassed by police, their clothes, sleeping bags, or tents stolen or vandalised (DdD 2017; HRW 
2017, 15-16, 20-21). Witnesses speak of police deliberately contaminating food and drinking 
water with pepper spray (Ibid, 15). Arbitrary arrests lead to long periods of detention with 
high risk of deportation (RRDP 2017, 11). Violence is common in encounters with police. 
Many migrants bear the marks of these encounters on their bodies, with numerous injuries 
reported including broken bones, dislocated joints, and medical complications from repeated 
exposure to pepper spray (Ibid, 9-10, 13). These border encounters take their toll mentally 
and physically in the form of exhaustion, near starvation, dehydration, exposure, anxiety and 
trauma (DdD 2017, 4; HRW 2017, 23-24). And they regularly result in death as people risk 
their lives to avoid police aggression and circumvent controls.
7
  
 In the everyday encounters that make up this hostile environment, the border's 
racialised geopolitical divisions between regularity/irregularity are embodied as powerful 
realities in the local geography of Calais and intimately inscribed on migrant bodies. For the 
targets of deterrence, ordinary things like washing, feeding oneself, relaxing, getting warm or 
staying dry, keeping hold of personal affects, sitting in a park or at a bus stop without being 
accosted, frisked, moved on or arrested, become a constant struggle with the border. Reports 
of a woman forced 'to give birth in the back of a truck' while trying to cross the border 
intimately embody so many violent injustices of gender and race (RRDP 2016, 26). This 
intimacy is central to the hostile environment agenda in Calais aimed at literally making life 
unliveable for certain subjects divided according to racialised global borderlines. Its coercive 
force lies not simply in bordering space but in bordering subjects by making certain forms of 
life, identity, and relations almost (though never entirely) impossible. The Calais border 
irregularises people, marginalises them spatially, socially, and politically, while it makes 
irregular life unliveable, a necessarily intimate endeavour. Thus, the structural racism of 
European borders gets intimately embodied in the routine racism of everyday segregation in 
Calais, marking out boundaries of who does/not belong, who can/not move freely, in the 
differential lived experiences of spatial location and social relations. 
 15 
 The everydayness of these intimate encounters is crucial to how the border works. In 
a recent Human Rights Watch report (2017), migrants testify to the normalisation of 
destitution and abuse: 'This is normal for us, it is part of our life […] just normal – this is 
something that happens everyday' (19), 'this is our life every day' (23). Through the repetitive 
everydayness of segregation, the border’s divisions are normalised as a racialised geopolitics 
is embodied and given material effect. Furthermore, happening on the margins, this violence 
is concealed from other residents, normalising segregation and their continued complicity in 
its workings. Through everyday segregation the border is intimately brought to life 
differently for different people, reproducing the racialised, geographic, and economic 
divisions and injustices of global borders. For some, these borders are easily ignored or 
affirmed as tokens of privilege, for others they construct ‘a place [s/]he runs up against 
repeatedly, passing and repassing through it […] a place where [s/]he resides’ (Balibar 2002, 
83).    
 Seeing how the Calais border is produced 'everyday' confronts us with its 'globally 
intimate' injustices (Peterson 2017). The world is made in these everyday border encounters 
as unequal and divided, the privileges of some premised on the denial of others. In Calais the 
'grand' racially exclusionary geopolitics of European borders is enacted through 'minor' 
everyday practices, the interruption of meals, contamination of water, breaking of tents, and 
physical assault of migrants. The border is embodied in biting winds rolling off the sea, 
soaking rain, invasive police frisking, relentless scabies itching, and sleepless nights running 
from batons and pepper spray. Importantly, I have argued, these everyday features of the 
border are not incidental to its geopolitical power but rather give the 'hostile environment' its 
texture, bringing an inequitable racialised global ontology intimately to life as an embodied 
political reality.  
6. Against segregation: intimately global solidarity in everyday life 
By focusing on the intimate everyday embodiment of global borders I am not suggesting they 
are inescapable. People move despite border controls, subverting, escaping, evading, 
rejecting and resisting borders every day. It is precisely because of this that borders require so 
much violent everyday work. In this final section, I point to everyday acts of solidarity amid 
everyday bordering which practically undermine segregation and confront the global 
injustices of border politics. 
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 The global racism of border segregation in Calais did not go unchallenged by 
migrants themselves. In everyday encounters people would reference the violences of a 
shared post/colonial history or the double-standards of Europe's commitment to human rights 
as evidence of the globally intimate injustices of their present situation. Graffiti on the 
entrance to one migrant squat juxtaposed the revolutionary French declaration 'liberté, 
egalité, fraternité' with the accusation 'why always black man?' confronting passers-by with 
historic contradictions of European Enlightenment values and racism still embodied in 
contemporary border policing.  
 During my visits to Calais, migrants regularly staged protests against the border, 
linking their daily struggles to global political events. In November 2014 Syrians in Calais 
held a twenty-day silent vigil outside the port calling for freedom to move and seek asylum in 
the UK. Later that month the Sudanese community marched through Calais's streets 
protesting reports of mass rapes perpetrated by government militias in Darfur and calling on 
the International Criminal Court to indict president al-Bashir for genocide. In September 
2015, as the 'jungle' segregation was nearing completion, hundreds of migrants protested for a 
week in the town centre bearing signs declaring 'this border kills', 'freedom of movement for 
all', and 'no one is illegal'. One group of Syrian refugees held a banner with a drawing of 
three-year old Alan Kurdi, whose drowning on 2 September had been widely publicised, and 
the words 'Don't wake him up until his people are FREE' (CMS 2015b). Over the years, 
migrants have engaged in hunger strikes and lip-sewing protests and organised No Borders 
camps alongside international activists (Rigby & Schlembach 2013). All these protests 
addressed the globally intimate injustices of the border, protestors linking their own 
intimately embodied struggles against segregation in Calais with international relations of 
power and forms of violence that are at once local and global.  
6.1 The politics of 'the camp' 
Within the scholarly literature on 'migrant activisms' there is a divide between those who see 
such protests as emergent forms of transnational citizenship and those who critique the 
inability of familiar political performances to radically challenge the exclusionary power of 
state sovereignty (Nyers 2015; Tyler & Marciniak 2013). These latter instead foreground 
migrants' 'autonomous' movements as offering an 'escape' from state control and the confines 
of citizenship towards a more revolutionary 'common' form of politics (Papadopoulos & 
Tsianos 2013). There is also a corresponding debate among critical border scholars between 
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those who emphasise sovereign power and control and those who emphasise migrant agency, 
resistance, and refusal in their analyses (Vaughan-Williams 2015, 123). At the intersection of 
these debates, scholars raise questions concerning whether migrant camps such as the Calais 
'jungle' are depoliticised deathly spaces of exceptional sovereign power, dehumanisation, and 
abandonment (Minca 2015) or vibrantly politicised 'lived spaces' prefiguring a world without 
borders (Rygiel 2012). 
 These theoretical divisions are often presented as binary and tend to over-determine 
migrant camps in abstract terms of either 'control' or 'resistance' (Vaughan-Williams 2015, 
123). An everyday perspective, however, allows us to appreciate migrant camps as messy 
contested spaces where both conditions coexist and conflict with each other. Even within the 
'new jungle' in Calais, a space undeniably characterised by precarity, everyday political 
contestations around border segregation were evident. Nor was the 'new jungle' a unified 
space but divided up between the self-constructed migrant camp, the charity-run Jules Ferry 
for vulnerable people, and the heavily securitised 'humanitarian' container camp for those 
claiming asylum in France.  
 Yet, focusing on 'the camp' as the paradigmatic migrant space, politicised or 
depoliticised, remains problematic. Migrants escape camps even as they organise (within) 
them, and camps are simply one location for broader struggles between state control and 
migrant mobility rather than defining of them. Not all migrant spaces are camps, nor are all 
camps equivalent in operation and purpose (Ramadan 2013). As I indicate in this article, 
faced with border segregation migrants continuously create autonomous spaces to provide 
(limited) security and strategic mobility. At a mundane level, these spaces enable a precarious 
yet vital sense of 'home' (Mould 2017), offering opportunities to cook, sleep, meet others, 
share stories around a fire and other ordinary intimate activities denied by border segregation 
(King 2016). They support people to live despite the hostile environment built around them 
and to keep trying to cross. In doing so, they pose a powerful challenge to the border which is 
both practical and symbolic, banal and profound, intimate and global. Why else is so much 
borderwork in Calais focused on their containment, eviction, and destruction?  
6.2 The politics of 'chance' 
An overlooked but crucial site where migrants contest border segregation is the motorway. In 
2014/2015 every day and night migrants went to the motorways around the port and Channel 
Tunnel to hide themselves within or underneath heavy goods vehicles bound for the UK. 
 18 
There migrants encountered the border as segregation backed up by police violence, their 
'irregularity' intimately embodied in their denied mobility. Yet the motorways also provided 
the best chance of subverting the border by collectively rushing traffic jams (ironically, 
caused by increased security measures at the port and Channel Tunnel terminal).  
One Sunday morning in December 2014, sounds of the Tigrinya sermon came from the 
tarpaulin church in Tioxide, drumbeats and singing mixing with the bustle of the surrounding 
camp. Suddenly, calls went up from the motorway above where a traffic jam was forming on 
the way into the port. All around people began running, alone or in groups, beckoning others 
to follow. Heads popped out of the church, shoes slipped on, as congregation members 
gradually jogged up the mound adjacent to the motorway to join the growing crowd. Several 
groups were already moving down the miles-long line of traffic and between the vehicles, 
working quickly some people would distract the drivers while others opened the truck doors 
and closed them again with people inside. Soon flashing lights and sirens of police vans 
arrived, driving up the hard shoulder, officers jumping out with gas at the ready, checking 
trucks and chasing after the mobile groups. People in the watching crowd whistled or called 
out warnings when the police were closing in. After an hour or so more vans arrived, spilling 
out riot officers with shields and armour who fired teargas grenades into the gathered 
onlookers forcing them back towards the 'jungle'. Returning to the tents a man said wearily 
but smiling 'No chance today. Tomorrow, inshallah'. 
Such encounters were a daily occurrence in 2014/2015. While spontaneous and disorganised 
they were routine, allowing migrants unable to afford smugglers' fees an opportunity to cross 
in the relative security of numbers. The mundane individual acts of support people provided 
each other in these moments meant at least some people had the 'chance' to cross the border 
each day. That these everyday acts of solidarity were also political acts against segregation 
was evidenced during a protest I observed in August 2015: 
 A group of twenty migrants were blocked by police from leaving the 'new jungle' to attend a 
protest against the British Home Secretary's visit to Calais. In response, they occupied the 
motorway bridge above the camp, blocking oncoming vehicles and calling down for support 
from below. Soon hundreds of people had brought traffic to a standstill creating a tailback 
several miles long. Holding banners declaring 'we shall overcome' alongside an image of a 
figure behind bars and denouncing the 'apartheid ghetto' they pressed against gathering 
police lines and chanted into the newly arrived media cameras: ‘We are not animals, we are 
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human beings, we are migrants, we are not criminals! We have rights to live anywhere! Open 
the border! Open the border!’ (CMS 2015a).  
Here border segregation worked by isolating people geographically in the jungle but also by 
denying them access to the rights and civic space of citizenship. It was enforced through 
racial profiling and physical coercion. In response, migrants went where they go every day, 
the motorway, disrupting the border and its usual flows to highlight inequalities of freedom 
of movement in Europe and racialised injustices of border segregation. However, this act was 
not only a political spectacle for news channels. By causing a traffic jam, it also served to 
create practical 'chances' for people to subvert the border and reject segregation. 
 In this encounter, state control and migrant autonomy, clandestine movement and 
spectacular protest, global and everyday are intimately intertwined. Seeing border struggles 
as everyday reveals how intimate acts often dismissed as mundane, depoliticised, or criminal 
are crucial to challenging the reproduction of a racialised global geopolitics. As King has 
argued (2017) in the gestures of everyday solidarity, support, and community by migrants in 
Calais we can see a politics of 'refusal' (24-28) in which they resist the border by 'taking 
action in ways that effectively turn away from the state and seek to live a life as if it wasn't 
there' (19). The radical power of these everyday practices lies not in their embodying a form 
of ‘transgressive citizenship’ (Rygiel 2012) but in their ordinariness, how they intimately, 
momentarily, but concretely overcome segregation in Calais and prefiguratively embody 
other ways of living and doing politics without borders. For anyone interested in migrant 
solidarity, it is important to recognise the globally intimate politics of these everyday 
struggles.  
7. Conclusion 
This article offered an account of the 'globally intimate' injustices of everyday borders in 
Calais, showing how a racialised geopolitics of global borders is embodied locally through 
everyday practices of segregation. The everydayness of this segregation is crucial to the 
creation of a hostile environment for people identified as 'irregular' and underlies the border's 
power of division and world-making. Yet also, in the everyday lives of those struggling with 
and against this segregation, we find powerful political opposition to the border's injustices 
embodied in intimate ways.  
 Seeing borders as intimately embodied in the everyday presents a different picture of 
them. Rather than assuming framings of migrants as either 'problematic' or 'positive' it shows 
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the work and resources required to construct and maintain the divisions of 'us'/'them' or 
'citizen'/'noncitizen' borders presuppose. It highlights bordering as a practice of segregation 
which violently embodies racialised inequalities of identity, wealth, power, and precarity. 
Seeing bordering as everyday segregation also confronts us with our complicity in its violent 
embodiment while simultaneously pointing towards intimate everyday ways it can be and is 
struggled against. Seeing the geopolitical through a lens of embodied intimacy brings us back 
into our relations with others and our position in the world, calling on us to challenge 
injustice in the everyday.  
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1 In this article I use descriptive vignettes (italicised) based on fieldwork encounters and observations 
in Calais in 2014/2015 to evoke how the border is intimately embodied in everyday life. 
2 The Sudanese government has been accused of ethnic cleansing in the Darfur, South Kordofan, and 
Blue Nile regions where it has fought a decade and half conflict with rebel groups (see Human Rights 
Watch [HRW] 2018).  
3 I elaborate on this border system further in section 2.  
4 Labels 'regular' and 'irregular' are products of a regime of border control and governance. This 
language is political, as are terms like ‘migrants’ or ‘asylum seekers’, ‘the jungle’ etc. and how we use 
them is important. In the context of Calais, they are highly racialised labels. In this article, I use these 
terms antagonistically to highlight the ordinariness of migration, as the movement of people, and 
the violence of irregularisation experienced by some people but not others. For a good discussion 
see Millner (2011). 
5 The case of Jimmy Mubenga is a famous example. Mubenga was killed on board a plane in October 
2010 during an attempt to deport him, dying of cardiac arrest because of the restraining methods 
used by G4S private security guards. They were later acquitted of manslaughter despite passenger 
testimony that Mubenga was crying out ‘I can’t breathe’ (Webber 2014). 
6 Translation mine. 
7 CMS (2019) maintain an updated list of reported deaths at the Calais border. 
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